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ABSTRACT
Transition patterns from school to work differ considerably across
OECD countries. Some countries exhibit high youth unemploy-
ment rates, which can be considered an indicator of the difficulty
facing young people trying to integrate into the labour market.
At the same time, education is a time-consuming process, and
enrolment and dropout decisions depend on expected duration of
studies as well as on job prospects with and without completed
degrees. One way to model entry into the labour market is by
means of job-search models, where the job arrival hazard is a key
parameter in capturing the ease or difficulty in finding a job.
Standard models of job search and education assume that skills
can be upgraded instantaneously (and mostly in the form of on-
the-job training) at a fixed cost. This paper models education as a
time-consuming process, a concept which we call time-to-educate,
during which an individual faces the trade-off between continuing
education and taking up a job.
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I. MOTIVATION
Transition patterns from school to work differ considerably across OECD
countries. Column (1) of Table 1 shows that the percentage of youths
completing upper secondary education ranges from 68 to 100 percent in
OECD countries.1 The percentage of the population within the age
bracket 25–34 that have attained university education (tertiary type A
education), which is displayed in column (2), depends on two factors:
first, the transition rate between upper secondary education and
university and, second, the survival rate in university, i.e., the fraction
of students completing their studies. The survival rate in university is
displayed in column (3). Several things are noteworthy about the survival
rate in university; in all countries, a number of students drop out of
university without obtaining a degree. On average, 30 percent of students
in OECD countries do not complete their studies. Part of the explanation
for this phenomenon is probably that some students give up, because they
TABLE 1
Education and labour market indicators
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Belgium 79 18 60* 15.3
Czech Republic 81 12 61 16.6
Denmark 100 23 69 8.3
Finland 85 21 75 19.9
France 82 19 59 18.7
Germany 93 13 70 8.4
Iceland 79 23 73 4.8
Ireland 77 23 85 6.2
Italy 82 12 42 27.0
Japan 92 25 94 9.7
Spain 68 25 77 20.8
Sweden 72 22 48 11.8
United States 73 31 66 10.6
Country mean 81 19 70 12.4
Source: OECD Education at a Glance 2004 and OECD Employment Outlook.
Notes: Column (1) displays upper secondary graduation rates (2002), i.e., the percentage of
upper secondary graduates to the population at the typical age of graduation in public and
private institutions. Column (2) displays the percentage of the population age 25–34 that has
attained tertiary type A education (2002). Column (3) displays survival rates in tertiary type
A education (2000), i.e., the number of graduates divided by the number of new entrants in
the typical year of entrance in all university programmes. Column (4) displays youth
unemployment rates (2001), i.e., the percentage of the labour force aged 15–24 in
unemployment.
*Refers to Flanders.
1The table contains all OECD countries with non-missing information on the four
indicators.
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realize that they are not ‘college material’. Another striking feature of
column (3) is the considerable variation in survival rates across countries.
While 94 percent of those starting university in Japan manage to complete
their degrees, only 42 percent of students in Italy complete their studies.
Taking the complement of survival rates, we arrive at the dropout rate,
which ranges from 6 percent in Japan to a staggering 58 percent in Italy.
This raises the question what the driving forces are behind university
enrolment and dropout behaviour. One factor which may be relevant in
understanding the transition from school to work is the youth unemploy-
ment rate, which can be considered an indicator for the difficulty that
youths have to integrate into the labour market.
Our conjecture is that high youth unemployment rates at the time of
leaving high school may induce some youths to go to university (in
particular, when tuition fees are low) who would not have done so in
the case of more favourable labour market conditions. These students
may continue searching for a job while enrolled in university and may
drop out once they receive a job offer.
In the next section, we formalize this idea in the form of a simple
job-search model, in which education is explicitly modelled as a time-
consuming process, which we will call time-to-educate. This is a novel
feature in the job-search literature, where education/training is usually
modelled as a cost in the value functions of either the worker or the firm,
depending on who is assumed to pay for the education/training (e.g.,
Mortensen and Pissarides, 1998; Pissarides, 2000). In many of these
models, skills can be upgraded instantaneously at some cost c (see for
example, Coles and Masters, 2000; Masters, 1998).2 This is a reasonable
assumption when the duration of training is negligible (e.g., an intensive
course of a month or so). It is clearly inadequate when education/
training is time consuming and when the focus is on understanding
transitions among employment, unemployment and education/training.
In the transition from high school to work, further education beyond
compulsory schooling is clearly a time-consuming process. After finish-
ing compulsory schooling, the decision to carry on with education
depends on the relative job prospects in terms of wages and employment
probabilities at different education levels as well as on the time expected
to obtain a further degree. Time to completion varies considerably
among individuals, especially in university education (see Becker, 2001).
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the following main section, we
present a model of job search which introduces education as a separate
labour market status, thereby capturing the idea of time-to-educate and
2An exception is Malcomson et al. (2003), who explicitly take into account contract
length of apprenticeship contracts. Their focus, however, is on firm training while our
focus is on formal (classroom) education.
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endogenizing the (opportunity) cost of education. The final section
concludes and discusses two empirical examples.
II. THE MODEL SETUP
Consider a continuous time model with two skill types, unskilled and
skilled. We can think of the skilled as holding a university degree and the
unskilled as being high school graduates without a university degree.
The unskilled can carry on with education, and, obtaining a degree, they
become skilled. Unskilled workers can be either unemployed, in educa-
tion, or employed, while skilled workers can only be unemployed or
employed. Denote by Uu the expected present discounted value (PDV)
of income of an unskilled unemployed and by Us the PDV of income for
a skilled unemployed. Wu and Ws denote the PDV of being an unskilled
employed and of being a skilled employed, respectively, and Eu the PDV
of being an unskilled in education. Uu, Us, Wu, Ws and Eu can be given
asset interpretations and their relationship can be written in the form of
arbitrage equations. Note that we do not model the firm side here to
save on space and for clarity of exposition.
Let b be the flow value of income while unemployed, wu the wage rate of
the unskilled and ws the wage rate for the skilled, all of which are taken to
be exogenous.3 r denotes the rate of time preference. Assume that an
unskilled unemployed has a constant probability u of finding a job at
any instant, and a skilled unemployed finds a job with instantaneous
probability s. Then, we canwrite the asset equations definingUu andUs as
rUu ¼ bþ uðWu UuÞ ð1Þ
rUs ¼ bþ sðWs UsÞ ð2Þ
Note that we could allow for different flow values of income for the
two skill groups (bu  bs). This would not give any significant insights,
however, but would come at the price of more cumbersome notation.4
An unskilled can take further education, in which case he receives job
offers with instantaneous probability u that he can accept or reject and
with instantaneous probability i he obtains a degree and becomes
skilled.5 Note that the job arrival and degree arrival processes are
assumed to be independent, i.e., they are ‘competing risks’. Due to the
search friction, newly graduated individuals first go through a spell of
3Because the number of school leavers entering the labour market is small compared
with the total labour force, we can reasonably consider school leavers to be price takers,
with wu and ws determined by the distribution of skills in the population.
4Actually, later on, we will even set b equal to 0, without loss of generality.
5Implicit in this setup is the assumption that only degrees matter and that some
education but no degree is no better than no education at all. The assumption that only
degrees matter is known as sheepskin effects.
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unemployment. Remark that  is indexed by an individual-specific index
i, allowing for heterogeneity in ‘degree achievement rates’. This reflects
the fact that the expected time for reaching a degree varies considerably
by individual. i can be interpreted as individual ability, and the setup
therefore reflects the idea that more able students obtain a degree more
quickly than less-able students. Let be be the flow value of income while in
education. In the case of an explicit financial cost of education, be may
actually be negative. We can now write the asset equation defining Eu as
rEu;i ¼ be þ iðUs  Eu;iÞ þ u maxðWu  Eu;i; 0Þ ð3Þ
where we assume u < u,
6 to rule out the unrealistic feature that no
unskilled are ever observed in unemployment, because always Eu,i > Uu.
Modelling education as a separate labour market status captures the idea
of time-to-educate and endogenizes the (opportunity) cost of education.
The asset equations for Wu and Ws are very simple.
rWu ¼ wu ð4Þ
rWs ¼ ws ¼ gwu ð5Þ
where g > 1 measures the wage gap between skilled and unskilled
workers. The assumption implicit in equations (4) and (5) is that once
the worker finds a job he can keep it forever. Hence, he never again faces
unemployment.7
II.1 Solving the model
The model features two decision thresholds. Unskilled unemployed
decide whether to enrol or remain unemployed whereas enrolled individ-
uals decide whether to accept job offers and drop out or to continue
education. We first consider the decision to drop out of education and
then look at the enrolment decision. To keep solutions at both margins
tractable and to focus on the most interesting effects, we will set b ¼ 0,
without loss of generality. However, we will let be  0, thereby allowing
for explicit financial costs of education. This permits us to study the
effect of an increase or decrease in tuition fees on enrolment and drop-
ping out behaviour.
II.1.1 The dropout margin
When a job offer arrives, an unskilled individual in education can either
accept or reject it. Given the heterogeneity in degree achievement rates/
ability, there will be a marginal type of individual who is exactly indif-
6This may be reasonable if those in education have less time for job search than those in
unemployment.
7The model can be easily extended to allow for job destruction at the expense of more
cumbersome notation. This version of the model is available upon request.
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ferent between continuing education and dropping out. For this indivi-
dual, the condition Wu ¼ Eu,i holds. Solving equation (1) for Uu and
equation (2) for Us and substituting in equations (4) and (5), respec-























For the marginal individual, the last term in equation (3) disappears
































This expression defines a threshold value d for an individual indif-
ferent between continuing education and dropping out. For individuals
with i > 
d, the last term in (3) disappears, and they continue educa-
tion until they obtain a degree. For individuals with i < 
d, both the
second and the third term in (3) are ‘active’ and whatever event comes
first (‘competing risks’), degree or job offer, they turn skilled or they
drop out.
We now want to see how changes in the parameters of the model
affect individuals at the margin d (and thereby also individuals off the
margin). We can do so by applying the implicit function theorem to the
following equation which follows directly from equation (9).8
d





gwu  wu ¼ 0 ð10Þ
All ceteris paribus changes have the expected impacts on the dropout
margin; holding all other parameters constant, a marginal increase in the
wages of the unskilled, wu, induces more people to drop out of educa-
tion. A marginal increase in the wages of the skilled, ws, or alternatively
in the wage gap g, provides an incentive for students to stay in uni-
versity. As the job arrival rate for skilled unemployed, s, goes up, more
students tend to continue university. Notice that the job arrival rate for
unskilled unemployed, u, does not enter the optimum. An increase in
8Derivations for marginal effects can be found in the Appendix.
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the discount rate, r, has a negative effect on staying in university. A
decrease in tuition fees, i.e., an increase in be  0, reduces dropout.
We can now turn to the entry margin.
II.1.2 The entry margin
Now, we want to consider the decision to enter university, i.e., find the
conditions for Eu,i  Uu. From the previous analysis (see equation (9)),
we know that the threshold d is independent from u. We can therefore
distinguish two cases: i < 
d and hence Wu > Eu,i, and i > 
d and
hence Wu < Eu,i.




rþ i þ u
ðbe þ iUs þ uWuÞ
¼ 1













From there, we can write the inequality Eu,i  Uu as follows:
ber
rþ i þ u
þ i










This equation defines a new threshold value e < d that determines
whether an unskilled prefers to remain unemployed or to carry on with
education. If i < 
e, the chance of obtaining a degree is so low that it
cannot trade off the lower job arrival rate in education (remember
u < u). If i > 
e, the lower job arrival rate in education is set off
by a sufficiently high degree achievement rate and therefore makes going
to education worthwhile.
The second case is much simpler. Because always Uu < Wu but at
the same time Wu < Eu,i in this second case, we find Uu < Eu,i and
therefore everyone with i > 
d goes to education. This is self-evident
after studying the previous case: observe that i > 
d > e yields the
same result.
To sum up, there are three ranges of the ability parameter and three
corresponding decision rules: i < 
e – those with a very low ability
choose to remain unemployed instead of going to education;
e < i < 
d – in this intermediate case, unskilled individuals choose to
carry on with education but drop out of education as soon as they obtain
a job offer; i > 
d: unskilled individuals with high ability prefer educa-
tion to unemployment and stay in education until obtaining a degree even
in the presence of job offers.
Figure 1 illustrates the possible cases.
Again, we can apply the implicit function theorem to equation (12) to
see how different parameter values affect individuals at the margin of
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enrolling in university or remaining unemployed.9 Holding all other
parameters constant, a marginal increase in the wages of the unskilled,
wu, induces more unskilled to remain unemployed. In contrast, an
increase in the wages of the skilled, ws, or alternatively in the wage
gap, g, provides an incentive to more students to enrol in education.
In the same way, as the job arrival rate for skilled unemployed, s, goes
up, more students enrol in education. An increase in the job arrival rate
for the unskilled unemployed, u, increases the number of people pre-
ferring to remain unemployed. An increase in be, i.e., a decrease in
tuition fees, increases enrolment as expected. An increase in the job
arrival rate while in education, u, has an ambiguous effect on enrol-
ment. The most likely case is the case of higher enrolment when u goes
up, as one might expect. However, there are parameter constellations, in
particular when ws and s are high, for which an increase in u has the
counter-intuitive effect of decreasing enrolment. This can be explained
as follows: for potential dropouts, i.e., those with i < 
e, the ‘utility’ of
enroling in university is a weighted average of unskilled (outside) wage
offers and skilled wage offers upon graduation. Because outside wage
offers and degree arrival are ‘competing risks’, an increase in u makes it
less likely that the degree is completed before the first job offer arrives.
More weight is thus given to the unskilled wages, which makes univer-
sity ceteris paribus less attractive.
II.1.3 The dropout rate
To compute the fraction of dropouts, assume that i is distributed over
the interval (0, 1) with distribution function F(i). Then the expected
fraction of dropouts is given by [F(d)  F(e)]/[1  F(e)].
Not in university In university
Not enrolled Potential dropouts ‘Stayers’
Eu,i > WuEu,i < Uu Uu < Eu,i < Wu
0 γiγi < γ e γi > γ dγ e < γi < γ d γ dγ 
e
Fig. 1. Possible cases in the model.
9The derivations are again in the Appendix.
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Note that in a cross-section of individuals, there are two margins
affecting enrolment behaviour: the unskilled can choose to enrol or
not and the enrolled can choose to accept job offers when they arrive
or to reject them. Behaviour of individuals at both the margins jointly
determines total enrolment and dropout. Interestingly, comparative sta-
tics at both the margins separately give an unambiguous answer on
enrolment and dropout behaviour. For instance, an increase in the
wage gap g increases the number of individuals who both start education
(entry margin) and reject job offers while in education (dropout margin).
Therefore, the unambiguous effect of an increase in skilled wages is a
higher fraction of individuals in education. What is ambiguous is the
implication for the dropout rate. To see this, consider an increase in the
wage gap g: both d and e go down and the shift of d relative to e
determines whether the dropout rate [F(d)  F(e)]/[1  F(e)] goes up
or down.
Conditioning on the values of all other parameters (which uniquely
determine the thresholds e and d), differences in the ability distribu-
tion F(i) will affect the fraction of dropouts. If the group of students
holding a university-entry certificate is less able in country 1 than in
country 2, then we expect more students to drop out of university. This
describes the selection issue associated with university entry.
III. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION OF APPLICATIONS
We presented a job-search model with two skill types, unskilled
and skilled, in which the unskilled (high school graduates) can go to
university and become skilled (university graduates). The two skill levels
are associated with different job market opportunities. Modelling
education as a separate labour market status captures the idea of time-
to-educate and endogenizes the (opportunity) cost of education.
Depending on their expected time of completion, some individuals
might drop out of education before obtaining a degree if they get
a job offer. The model is able to explain transitions among
education, employment and unemployment. The time-to-educate model
is particularly relevant in understanding job search when education/
training is a separate labour market state, and when obtaining a degree
is time consuming, a feature typically neglected in the job-search
literature.
As one striking empirical example, about 60 percent of all students in
Italy drop out of university before obtaining a degree (Table 1) (Becker,
2001). In accordance with the time-to-educate model, entering university
is the most rational thing to do when faced with the absence of job
opportunities immediately after leaving high school (remember Italy’s
extremely high youth unemployment rate in Table 1). The absence of
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tuition fees is also a factor in this decision.10 For many students, how-
ever, university serves as a parking lot. They drop out as soon as they get
the first suitable job offer but obtain a degree in case they never get a job
offer throughout their studies. Obviously, some students may simply be
misguided in going to university, i.e., are not ‘college material’. As
empirical evidence of the existence of the parking lot phenomenon,
Becker (2001), using data from the 1998 survey of high school leavers
(Percorsi di studio e di lavoro dei diplomati Indagine 1998) and pro-
vided by the Italian National Statistical Office (Istat), shows that the
vast majority of Italian dropouts give ‘accepted job offer’ or ‘found
studies too difficult’ as the main explanation for dropping out
(alternative reasons being, for example, ‘enlistment to compulsory mili-
tary service’ and ‘personal motives’). Interestingly, the vast majority of
those who found their studies too difficult began working shortly after
dropping out. Hence, a large number of them might have dropped out
because not only the studies were too difficult but also their job pro-
spects were sufficiently positive.11 The acceptance of job offers is there-
fore the major motive for dropping out of university in Italy. The time-
to-educate model rationalizes the economic mechanisms behind the
parking lot phenomenon.
The time-to-educate model can also be applied to advanced (formal)
training programmes later in career. Workers unemployed for some
exogenous reason can search for a new job or opt for a further training
programme to enhance their skills. When new job offers are received, a
worker in a training programme faces the same choice as a student in
university and has to trade off the costs and benefits of accepting job
offers.12
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APPENDIX A
Dropout margin
We can rewrite the left-hand side of equation (10) as a function G(x, d )
where d is the dropout threshold and x denotes any of the parameters
in the equation.












is positive because be  0. The denominator of (13) is thus always
positive. The sign of d ¢(x) will be positive whenever @G/@x is negative
and vice versa.
* d¢(wu) > 0, because @G/@wu ¼ 1.
* d¢(ws) < 0, because @G/@ws ¼ ds/(r þ d)(r þ s) > 0.
* d¢(g) < 0, because @G/@g ¼ dswu/(r þ d)(r þ s) > 0.
* d¢(s) < 0, because @G/@s ¼ [dws/(r þ d)]r/(r þ s)2 > 0.
* d¢(r) > 0, because @G/@r ¼ [d/(r þ d)2]be  {dsws(2r þ s)/
[(r þ d)(r þ s)]2} < 0.
* d¢(be) < 0, because @G/@be ¼ r/(r þ d) > 0.
APPENDIX B
Entry margin
We can rewrite the left-hand side of equation (12) as a function H(x, e)
where e is the (university) enrolment threshold and x denotes any of the
parameters in the equation.
Using the implicit function theorem, we can derive
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ðrþ e þ uÞ2
wu
¼ ber
ðrþ e þ uÞ2
þ rðsws  uwuÞ þ usðws  wuÞ
ðrþ e þ uÞ2ðrþ sÞ
which is positive, because be  0 and because sws  uwu > 0. The
denominator of (14) is thus always positive. The sign of e¢(x) will be
positive whenever @H/@x is negative and vice versa.
* e¢(wu) > 0, because @H/@wu ¼ u/(r þ i þ u)  u/(r þ u) ¼
[(u  u)  ue]/(r þ u)(r þ e þ u) < 0.
* e¢(ws) < 0, because @H/@ws ¼ [e/(r þ e þ u)]s/(r þ s) > 0.
* e¢(g) < 0, because @H/@g ¼ [e/(r þ e þ u)]s/(r þ s)wu > 0.
* e¢(s) < 0, because @H/@s ¼ [ews/(r þ e þ u)]r/(r þ s)2 > 0.
* e¢(u) > 0, because @H/@u ¼ rwu/(r þ u)2 < 0.
* e¢(u) + 0, because the sign of @H/@u ¼ ber/(r þ e þ u)2  e/
(r þ e þ u)2][s/(r þ s)]ws þ [(r þ e)/(r þ e þ u)2]wu is ambig-
uous (the first and third terms are positive and the second is negative).
The most likely case is the case of a positive sign of @H/@u, implying
more enrolment when u goes up, as one might expect. However,
there are parameter constellations, e.g., when ws (respectively the
wage gap g) and s are very high, for which an increase in u has
the counter-intuitive effect of decreasing enrolment. This is discussed
in the main text.
* e¢(be) < 0, because @H/@be ¼ r/(r þ e þ u) > 0.
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